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PAYING ATTENTION TO THE LITTLE MAN
BEHIND THE CURTAIN: DESTROYING THE
MYTH OF THE LIBERAL'S DILEMMA
I. INTRODUCTION
In the classic film The Wizard of Oz,' Dorothy and her companions
travel a long and arduous journey in order to eventually stand before the
"great and powerful Oz," and they are most assuredly awed by his
presence and force upon first sight of him. Within a short time, and with
the assistance of a curious canine, however, their attention is drawn to
some activity previously concealed behind a curtain. With some
examination-inadvertently encouraged by the hasty assurances of the
"great and powerful Oz" that reality is as he urges it and that all
observations to the contrary are to be disregarded--Dorothy and her
friends discover the little man behind the curtain and the truth behind the
fagade. This Comment urges the discovery and examination of that little
man behind the curtain responsible for the projection of an awesome, but
false, dichotomy between the interests of feminism and multiculturalism
regarding the role of cultural evidence in criminal prosecutions.
Generally, feminists and other liberals, and in particular multi-
culturalists, share the common goal of seeking to make American law
reflective of a greater variety of voices and experiences beyond those of
the dominant, white-male culture. There currently exists an issue, how-
ever, about which feminists find it necessary to depart from this goal:
whether to permit a criminal defendant to introduce exculpatory cultural
evidence.2 Much of the feininist literature on the use of the "cultural de-
fense" argues that introduction of such evidence serves only to deny
immigrant women and children the same protections afforded others in
our criminal justice system because the defendants invoking such a "de-
fense" tend to be immigrant males charged with crimes against women
or children pursuant to conduct that is tolerated as part of the defen-
dant's patriarchal, immigrant culture.3
This Comment will address the tension between the larger goals of
feminism and the current opposition to the use of a "cultural de-
1. TitWaARD OF OZ, (Metro-GoIdwyn-Mayer 1939).
2. Several writers have argued that the admission of evidence of a criminal defendant's
culture, while nominally advancing the goals of multiculturalism, must not be permitted to the
extent that its admission compromises other significant feminist goals. See, e.g., Doriane Lambelet
Coleman, Individualizing Justice-Through Multiculturalism: The Liberals 'Dilemma, 96 CoLUM.
L REV. 1093, 1095-98 (June 1996); Valerie L Sacks, An Indefensible Defense: On the Misuse of
Culture in Criminal Law, 13 ARm J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 523,534-37 (1996); Taryn F. Goldstein,
Comment, Cultural Conflicts in Court: Should the American Criminal Justice System Formally
Recognize a "Cultural Defense"?. 99 DICK. L. REv. 141, 167 (1994).
3. See Sacks, supra note 2, at 534-35; Coleman, supra note 2, at 1095-98; Goldstein, supra
note 2, at 162-64.
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fense'--what has been called the "liberal's dilemma.-' 4 In Part IL this
Comment explores the historical uses of cultural evidence in criminal
prosecutions and the recent role such evidence has played. Part E1 sum-
marizes the perceived dilemma as expressed in feminist legal writing.
Part IV examines the practice of female genital mutilation as exercised
in the United States and the unique opportunities it affords for an exam-
ination of the role of cultural evidence in criminal prosecutions, because
female genital mutilation is traditionally perpetrated upon girls by
women.5 Finally, Part V attempts to resolve the "liberal's dilemma,"
arguing that the dilemma arises from an overly narrow definition of
culture that is Eurocentric, racist, and sexist and from a misunderstand-
ing of the role of law in American society.
IL PAST AND PRESENT USE OF THE "CULTURAL DEFENSE"
A "cultural defense' is a legal strategy used to mitigate culpability or
to completely excuse behavior that would otherwise be deemed
criminal. 6 The defense is often explained as an offspring of the
underlying premise that the American criminal justice system should
recognize that persons from non-dominant cultures are entitled to
express their cultural identities even when that expression may embody
values that differ from those of the dominant culture There are two
principal rationales for such a defense. First, a person of a different
culture, newly arrived in the United States, should not be held responsi-
4. The "libera's dilemma" has been used to define the tension between the following two
positions: On the one hand, it is argued that admission of cultural evidence may expme some
women and children to violent and oppressive customs that would other-ise be criminal in the
United States, effectively adopt immigrant customs into American law, and reinforce cultural
stereotypes; on the othe hand, it is argued that the failure to admit evidence of a defendart's cultureimpmisibly imposes American culture and cultural demands upon immigrants vble ignoring the
validity of other cultures. See Coleman, supra note 2, at 1096.
5. Female genital mutilation involves the cutting away of portions of the female genitalia
and the subsequent seing up of the remaining tissue. Itis traditionally performed by women See
infra Part IV. Immigrant women facing criminal charges in the United States aising out of the
practice of female genital mutilation provide an interesting venue for the examination of the: role
of cultural evidence in criminal proceedings for the very reason that the defendants arm wom
charged with crimes of violence against other vomn and female children. Me d) amics rmove
much of the supposed dichotomy between the interests of multiculturalism and the interests of
feminists in the protection of immigrant victims from violence at the hands of immigrant males
allegedly acting consistently with the patriarchal norms of their cultures. The focus of much
feminist legal writing has been on violence committed by men upon women and children, ignoring
incidents of violence and oppression committed by women upon each other and their children in
alleged pursuance of cultural norms. See, e.g., Coleman, rtpra note 2, at 1095-96; Sacks, supra
note 2, at 534-35; Goldsten supra note 2, at 162-64. In addition, these dynamics necessita that
the feminist either choose between the interests of a female defendant or a female victim or depart
from the propensity for dualism and establish a principled solution which will best advance the
interests of all marginalized populations in the American criminaljustice sstem.
6. See Sharon M.Tomao, The CuraI Defense: TracdanalorFonraP?, 1OGED. INSMLt.
U-. 241, 241 (1996).
7. See, e.g., i&L
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ble for unwitting transgressions of American law and customs that are
new to her.' Second, the American legal system values individualism
and should respect various cultural practices, notwithstanding their
conflict with the expressed laws of the United States and each of the
individual states.9 This Author contends that the "cultural defense" is
best understood in light of the latter rationale.
The idea that a person from a different culture ought not to be held
responsible for "unwitting transgressions" is a misunderstanding of the
role that evidence of culture plays in the criminal justice process. Evi-
dence of culture is not offered to mitigate or excuse behavior that would
otherwise be criminal, absent evidence that it was consistent with the
defendant's cultural origins. It is offered in rebuttal to the prosecution's
case to mitigate or excuse behavior that would otherwise be criminal,
absent evidence that the defendant lacked the requisite state of mind be-
cause of his or her cultural beliefs or background."0 This country has
clearly rejected ignorance of the law as a defense to a crime charged.I
To this end, American jurisprudence does not recognize a formal
cultural defense, which in and of itself would be sufficient to mitigate
the culpability of a defendant.
Cultural evidence has, however, been introduced by defendants within
an established procedural context, either before trial as part of the plea-
bargaining process, during trial as evidence of a lack of mens rea or of
insanity, or after trial as a consideration during sentencing.12 Evidence
of non-dominant culture is introduced, not as an "ignorance of the law"
defense, but as one factor to be considered among many in evaluating
the existence of mitigating factors.
Considerations of culture are not new to the American legal system.
Criminal courts have considered culture in the trial and sentencing of
defendants for over a hundred years. In 1888, in United States v.
Whaley, 3 the Circuit Court of the Southern District of California
allowed defendants charged with murder to plead to the lesser offense
8. See The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L REV. 1293,1299 (1986).
9. See Coleman, supra note 2, at 1118-22.
10. See, e.g., People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868, 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
11. See, e.g., Cheekv. United States,498 U.S. 192,199(1991).
12. See, eg., United States v. Endnzaka Crim. A. No. 94-42 (JE), 1995 wL 263983, at *5-
6 (D.NJ. May 3, 1995) (admitting evidence of culture at sentencing); United States v. Whaley, 37
F. 145 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1888) (considering evidence of culture in plea-bargaining process); People
v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (admitting evidence of culture as relevant to defendant's state of
mind).
13. 37 F. 145 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1888). In Whaley, four members of a Native American tribe
had killed another member of the same tribe on the Tule River Indian Reservation. See icl at 145.
The decedent was an Indian doctor who had been so unsuccessful in his treatment of patients that
about 20 of them had died, causing members ofthe tribe to believe that he was poisoning them. See
id When a popular member of the tribe became sick under the decedent's treatment, the tribe held
a council and informed the decedent that he would be killed if his patient died. See id The patieni
did die under the decedent's care, and a council was held wherein it was determined that the
defendants would cany out the council's resolution to kill the doctor, which they did the following
morning. See idL It was for this killing that they were charged. See id
[Vol. 50:445
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of manslaughter after discussing the relevance of the defendants' "Indian
nature, their customs, superstition, and ignorance."' 4 Some years later,
a study titled The Immigrant s Day in Court cited a number of cases in
which judges accepted a defense to culpability based upon evidence of
differences between the defendant's culture and the culture and legal
system of the United States.' Courts have increasingly been willing to
consider evidence of a defendant's culture to mitigate culpability. 6 This
trend is consistent with an evolution in sentencing philosophy during the
past two decades towards more individualized justice.17 Although it is
arguable that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines"8 marked a shift away
from individualized sentencing, criminal defendants are generally
afforded a subjective evaluation of their conduct in the sentencing phase
of their prosecution.'
Today, there is little agreement among courts as to whether, and to
what extent, cultural evidence should be permitted to be introduced dur-
ing the criminal justice process to mitigate a defendant's culpability. In
Vang v. Toyede the Ninth Circuit stated that "expert testimony on issues
of culture is properly admitted when relevant and not unfairly prejudi-
cial.!" Courts differ, however, on their interpretation of what is
relevant.
14. Id at 146. The court allowed the defendants to plead to manslaughter on the grounds
that the requisite malice for murder was wanting. See i&
15. See KAxEHOu.ADAYCLAGHORN, THE IMMGRANT'S DAY IN COURT 101 (1923). The
study described a number of cases involving Italian immigrants in which men abducted women who
vwre under tho age of consent to marriage in the United States and whose parents refused to consent
rendering the men technically liable for the charge of rape, despite the fact that the vmen v= of
appropriate manying age in Italian culture. See id. Th'e study concluded that the ca=s therein
described indicated that the mental state of the immigrant defendant must be understood in order
to deal properly with such situations and that it was improper to analyze them under fixed, legal
definitions of crimes in the United States such as rape or adultemy. See i.
16. See Sacks, supra note 2, at 523; Tomao, supra note 6, at 241.
17. See Coleman, supmra note 2, at 1114-18.
18. F AL SENTENCNG GtmELINES MAUAL (1998).
19. See Coleman, srpra note 2, at 1114. "In enacting [the Federal Sentencing Guidelines],
Congress sought to achie'e three primary sentencing goals: honesty. unifonnity. and
proportionality." United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 962,963 (1st Cir. 1989).
20. 944 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1991) (ruling on civil rights action brought by femaxle Hmong
refugees and their husbands against employee ofthe state government employment security office
who allegedly raped the women when they contacted him individually about obtaining
employment).
21. Id at481 (relying on several criminal cases instating the role cultural evidence may play
in trial). In this case, evidence ofthe victim's Hmnong culture was admitted to explain her behavior
subsequent to the alleged acts of the defendant for the purpose of rebutting testimony that the
victim's behavior towards the defendant was inconsistent with one who had previously been raped
by him. See id. at 482. Much of the feminist legal writing expressing opposition to the use of
cultural evidence to excuse or mitigate the culpability of criminal defendants struggles to make
principled exceptions for the inclusion of such evidence to explain a victim's behavior. See infra
Part nL
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In Ha v. Alaska, the court allowed evidence of the defendant's
culture to be admitted for purposes of establishing that the defendant
acted in self-defense "to the extent that an understanding of [defendant
Ha's] Vietnamese culture was relevant to evaluating [the victim's]
motivation or readiness to kill Ha." The court found such evidence
relevant to the determination of the reasonableness of the defendant's
perception of imminent harm. The court distinguished the permissible
use of such evidence from that which would not be permissible, noting
that it would not allow the defendant to argue that "the law of self-
defense should make exceptions for people whose culture encourages
vendettas, killings to assuage personal honor, or preemptive killings, to
forestall future harm." This is a principled distinction that allows for
the admission of cultural evidence to the extent that it is relevant to
establish elements of the crime charged or the establishment of a legally
recognized defense, while rejecting it to the extent it is offered merely
in support of arguments that a defendant's culture alone is enough to
excuse or mitigate his culpability.
Similarly, the court in People v. WuO allowed the admission of
evidence of the defendant's culture and held that the defendant was
"entitled to have the jury instructed that it may consider evidence of
defendant's cultural background in determining the existence or non-
existence of the relevant mental states." The court expressly distin-
guished the permissible purposes for which this evidence was admitted
from the impermissible kdmission of such evidence for the purpose of
showing that the defendant was ignorant of the law and therefore
excused from its application to her case.'
Evidence of the defendant's culture has also been admitted in a
hearing on a defendant's motion to suppress evidence on the grounds
that he did not knowingly waive his constitutional rights.29 The court
determined that such evidence was relevant to the issue of whether the
defendant knowingly waived his constitutional rights because an
individual's "[c]ultural heritage clearly has some impact upon an
individual's full awareness of his or her rights and necessarily assumes
a role in the 'totality of the circumstances' analysis ... .30 The court
22. 892 P.2d 184 (Alaska Ct App. 1995).
23. Id. at 195.
24. See id
25. Id
26. 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. CL App. 1991).
27. Id at 887 (allowing evidence of defendant's Chinese culture to explain the level of stress
experienced by the defendant prior to the killing of her son and to show that the defendant intended
to kill herself and believed that sbe must kill her son to ensure that he would be taken care of after
her death).
28. Seeidat881.
29. See Liu v. Delaware, 628 A.2d 1376, 1379 (Del. 1993).
30. Id. at 1380; see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986) (reiterating the
"totality of the circumstances" test for determining whether a knowing waiver of constitutional
rights had been made).
[V/ol. 50:445450
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made it clear, however, that "[the fact that a defendant's alien status
may have prevented him from understanding the full, tactical signifi-
cance his decision to [waive certain rights] will not invalidate his
waiver." '3 It is not the defendant's culture that is ultimately significant
but, rather, the extent to which his culture goes to prove that his waiver
was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made-ae required
element for suppression of evidence on the grounds of failure of the
defendant to knowingly waive his constitutional rights?
Courts have admitted evidence of a defendant's culture in the
sentencing phase of trial as well, to attempt to show the existence of
mitigating factors.33 Such evidence is not admitted in support of the
argument that the defendant is entitled to be sentenced less harshly than
a defendant of the dominant culture solely because he or she acted
consistently with his or her cultural background. It is admitted because
it is relevant to the determination of a defendant's sentence in accor-
dance with the general principles of the relevant state's criminal law and
the factors for consideration laid out therein.
One court has admitted cultural evidence as relevant to the defen-
dant's motion to dismiss a prosecution pursuant to the state's de minimi
statute. ' The statute allowed the court to dismiss a prosecution if, "hav-
ing regard to the nature of the conduct alleged and the nature of the
attendant circumstances," the court finds that the defendant's conduct
was not of the nature envisioned by the legislature to be prohibited.'
The court in this case granted the motion to dismiss the prosecution of
the defendant for gross sexual assault based upon evidence of the
defendant's culture, which showed that his acts in kissing his son's penis
were done as a sign of affection consistent with his culture and were not
in the nature of those acts which the legislature intended to prohibit by
its gross sexual assault statute?6
Evidence of the defendant's cultural background has also been admit-
ted when offered by prosecutors to show that the crimes with which the
defendant is charged are consistent with practices accepted in the defen-
31. Liu v. Delaware, 628 A2d at 1381 (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. v. Yunis .859
F.2d 953, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
32. See id. at 1379 (citing Mirandav. Arizona, 384 US. 436.444 (1966)).
33. See. e.g., United States v. Ezeruna Crim. A. No. 94.42 (JE, 1995 WL263983, at *5-
6 (D.NJ. May 3,1995) (adming evidence of the ddffedant's culture to show coercion); Gluticz
v. State, 920 P.2d 987, 989 (Nev. 1996) (admitting evidence of dr-de df'ans culture to show that
he acted under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance).
34. See State v. Kargar, 679 A.2d 81, 83 (Me. 1996).
35. See id. (quoting M- REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A. § 12 (West 1983)). The sate also
allows for the dismissal of a prosecution where the defendant's conduct did not cause the har
which the legislatue had intended to protect when passing the criminal statute under which he was
charge& See MF. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A. § 12 (West 1983).
36. See id at 83, 86.
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dant's culture 7 and to challenge witness credibility." Prosecutors have
also sought to admit evidence of the victim's culture to explain the
victim's post-incident behavior.39
Some courts have, however, rejected requests to introduce evidence
of culture, finding such evidence irrelevant. In one case, a judge ruled
that the defendant had been exposed to United States culture for a
sufficiently lengthy period to make evidence of the defendant's native
culture irrelevant' In other cases, courts have rejected evidence of the
defendant's culture where the evidence sought to be introduced had no
bearing on the elements of the crime.!' Courts have also refused to
allow either the introduction of evidence of a defendant's culture or jury
instructions that would interpret a reasonable-person standard in terms
of a reasonable person of the defendant's culture.!2 In another case, the
court rejected evidence of the common culture of the defendant and the
victim, which the defendant sought to introduce in order to show how
the victim would have understood his behavior, ruling that it was
irrelevant to his defense.43
37. See, e.g., Varughese v. State, 892 S.W.2d 186, 193 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (admitting
evidence of the prevalence of wife-arming in India, the defendant's native country, in his
prosecution for the murder of his wife by immolation).
38. See, e.g., State v. Her. 510 N.W.2d 218,220-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (allowing the
admission of evidence of relations between the sexes in Hmong culture, the culture of both the
defendant and the victim, in the defendant's trial for rape to support the victim's testimony and to
rebut the defendant's testimony that the victim consented).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Calvin, No. ACM 30944, 1995 WL755285, at *1 (A.F. Ct.
Crim. App. Nov. 30,1995) (allowing the victim to explain her failure to report the alleged rape by
the defendant by explaining that reporting such things to the authorities was contrary to her Navajo
tribal custom). Interestingly, feminist legal writing generally supports the use of evidence that
explains victim behavior during and following the incident in this manner, engaging in significant
philosophical maneuvering to create a principled distinction between the use of such evidence and
the use of relevant evidence of a defendant's culture to mitigate or excuse otherwise criminal
behavior. Nee infra Part I.
40. See United States v. Ojo, 1997 WL 66725, at *1 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 6, 1997)
(finding evidence of the defendant's Nigerian culture irrelevant where the defendant had lived in
the United States for almost three years and had been in the United States military for almost two
years at the time of his offense).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Washington,. 836 F. Supp. 192, 198 (D. Vt. 1993) (denying
the defendant's request for funds for a witness who would testify to the purposes that young black
urban males may have for carrying a firearm because the purpose of carrying a firearm was
irrelevant to the firearms offense with which the defendant was charged); State v. Girmay, 652 A.2d
150, 152 (N.H. 1994) (excluding testimony about the Ethiopian defendant's social, cultural, and
political world in which he lived most of his life on the ground that the defendant had failed to show
its relevance to his state of mind at the time of the murders with which he was charged).
42. See, e.g., State v. Wanorw, 559 P.2d 548,559 (Wash. 1977) (refusing to allow evidence
of the effect of the defendant's Indian culture on her perceptions where she claimed that she acted
in self-defense, but finding a jury instruction that imposed a standard of reasonableness that
suggested a reasonable male standard was reversible error).
43. See People v. Rhines, 182 Cal. Rptr. 478,483 (Cal. CL App. 1982) (ruling, in a rape
trial, that evidence that African Americans tend to speak very loudly to each other was irrelevant
to the defendant's defense that he reasonably believed the victim consented to have sex with him).
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Evidence of a defendant's culture has been rejected by one court as
entirely irrelevant on the grounds that "persons in America are bound to
abide by American legal doctrine and American courts are obligated to
apply such doctrine: ' This argument fails to recognize that cultural
perceptions may well be relevant to various elements of the "American"
law that the courts apply. It assumes that the introduction of cultural
evidence to mitigate culpability is done outside of the established
criminal justice procedure of this country and is an exception to that
procedure which is unavailable to members of the dominant culture.
The .Truong court's reasoning is consistent with the same faulty
analysis which explains the introduction of cultural evidence to mitigate
or excuse culpability in terms of an ignorance-of-the-law defense, which,
though generally unavailable to criminal defendants, should be made
available to immigrants presumably unaware and unfamiliar with the
laws of this country.' The argument completely fails to understand the
role that evidence of a defendant's non-dominant culture plays within
the procedural context in which it is introduced. The Truong court
argument contends, instead, that the role of such evidence can be
explained only in terms of an exception to the criminal justice procedure
-that is unavailable to defendants of the dominant culture.6 The
argument assumes that evidence of a defendant's non-dominant culture
is being introduced to show that, merely because the defendant acted
consistently with his culture, his culpability should be mitigated. In fact,
such evidence is introduced because it is relevant either to prove that
some element of the crime charged did not exist or that some element of
a defense does exist. It is the successful rebuttal of proof of an element
of the crime charged, or the successful proof of the elements of a defense
posed, that mitigate the defendant's culpability. Were the evidence of
the defendant's culture irrelevant to either of these two issues, it would
be inadmissible to mitigate the defendant's culpability.
The failure to consider the procedural context within which cultural
evidence is introduced, and the resultant view of the use of such
evidence as an -exception to that procedure that is unavailable to
members of the dominant culture, creates tension for the feministf She,
who would generally justify the existence of such exceptions as
necessary to facilitate the inclusion of non-dominant peoples' influence
and power in a legal system, finds herself opposing such exceptions
because, viewed in this context, they result in excusing violence towards
women and children that otherwise would be criminal were it not for the
44. People v. Truong, 553 N.W.2d 692, 699 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
45. See, e.g., The Cultural'Defense in the Criminal Law, supra note 8. at 1299.
46. See People v. Truong, 553 N.W.2d at 699.
47. Tie Author uses the term "feniidst" With cantion, recogizing thait d=es a div
population with diffeing agendas. The term is used narrowly throughout this Commnt to refer to
those feminist legal scholars who have identified and attempted to resolve tf "liberal's dile=ma.-
In the broader sense, the Author uses it to refer to all those who am concerned Mith the inclusion
of the experiences and wisdoms of all marginalized populations in this country's legal system.
1998]
MAINE LA W REVIEW
behavior's consistency with the immigrant defendant's cultural
background.4 She focuses on cases in which immigrant male defendants
are charged with crimes against women and children and seek to
introduce evidence of the permissibility of their actions in their cultural
background to mitigate their culpability 9 She understands any resultant
mitigation of culpability as an unjust and unfair result for the victims of
the defendants' violence, believing that they have been afforded less
protection from patriarchal oppression than are women of the dominant
culture. ° She weighs the interests of immigrant defendants in having
evidence of their culture introduced at trial to mitigate culpability with
the interests of immigrant victims in being afforded the same protections
as victims of the dominant culture, and she determines that the interests
of the victims must prevail.5 1 Therefore, she opposes the introduction of
cultural evidence by defendants to mitigate culpability, despite the
general value she places on the inclusion of non-dominant voices in the
power structure of the dominant culture, including the legal system.5
The tension is then intensified when she is faced with cases of
differing factual scenarios, such as when the defendant is an immigrant
female charged with violence against her children who wishes to
introduce evidence of her culture to mitigate her culpability,53 or when
the prosecution wishes to introduce evidence of the victim's culture to
explain her pre- and post-incident behavior when such behavior is
inconsistent with the behavior expected by and from members of the
dominant culture in similar circumstances.' Opposing the introduction
of evidence of a criminal defendant's culture generally, she must then
attempt to make a principled argument for the admittance of evidence of
the victim's culture and of female immigrant defendants' culture when
it assists in holding the perpetrators of gender violence and oppression
accountable. Such philosophical gymnastics are the direct result of a
failure to understand the current use of cultural evidence within the
procedural context of the criminal justice system and will be analyzed
in greater detail in Part M1.
48. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 2, at 1095, 1166-67.
49. See id. at 1095 (noting that victims of crimes for which the defendant charged seeks to
introduce evidence of his culture to mitigate his culpability are "almost always minority women and
children").
50. See, e.g., id at 1095; Sacks, supra note 2, at 53435; Tomao, supra note 6, at 252;
Goldstein, supra note 2, at 162-63.
51. See Coleman, supra note 2, at 1097-98.
52. See id
53. See, e.g., People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Calvin, No. ACM 30944,1995 WL755285 (A.F. Ct Crim.
App. Nov. 30, 1995) (allowing a Navajo rape victim to explain her failure to report a rape by stating
that it was against tribal custom to report such events to the authorities and that the family dealt
with such matters).
(Vol. 50:445
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ILL THE DEMMA FOR FEMINISTS AS EXPRESSED IN FEINIST
LEGAL WRrrING
In 1994, Let Volpp, challenged the assumption, inherent in the notion
of a "cultural defense," that the law of the United States and each
individual state therein is acultural.' She explained how such an
assumption serves to subordinate members of the non-dominant culture
by distancing that culture from an "expert".American legal system and
placing the power unquestioningly in the hands of the expert to define
the "other" culture. She explained that this assumption depends upon
the "problematic positioning of recent immigrants ... as 'not American,'
[while] [r]eserving the term 'American' for those who seem fully
assimilated2"  Labeling populations in this way, she argued, denies the
"fluid and shifting nature of American identity" and disregards the fact
that immigrant experiences are a legitimate part of the identity of the
United States.
Volpp also examined the division between white feminists and
feminists of color on the issue of the use of cultural evidence to mitigate
culpability and noted that white feminists expressed complete opposition
to the use of such evidence while feminists of color wanted to retain the
possibility of using such evidence in some circumstances. She noted
55. See Led Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culwre: Asian Women and the 'Cutural Defense.'
17 HARV. WOEN's LJ. 57,61-62(1994) Ehenafer Volpp I]. The article %as aitten "firom the
subject position of an Asian Ameican woman," icd at 58, and focuses on tw cases involving Asian
womea and theintroduction of cultm'al vidence to mitigate the culpability of the defendants. See
1& at 59. In People v. DongLa Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dee. 2,1988), the dtfedant was
permitted to introduce evidence of his Chinese cultural background during trial and sentencing to
demonstrate that he lacked the requisite stabe of mind to be found guilty of murder or manslaughter
in the first degree. See i&t; Volpp I, supra, at 64. The defendant was sentenced to five )ars
probation for killing his wife, also a Chinese immigrant, with a hammer after learning that she had
committed adultery. SeePeoplev. DongLu Ch No. 87-7774; Volpp 1. supra, at 64. The cultral
evidence explained that it would be expected that a Chinese man would re t to soch information
in a much more volatile, violent way than would someone in the United States. See People v. Dong
Lu Chea, No. 87-7774; Volpp L supra, at 66. In People v. Wu, 286 CaL Rptr. 868 (CaL Ct. App.
1991), the defendant successfully sought to introduce evidence of her Chinese culture to
demonstrate that she lacked the requisite state of mind to be convicted of murder. See id. at 887;
Volpp 1, supra, at 86-87. The defndant was charged with the murder of her son, after she strangled
him and attempted immediately thereafter to take her own life. See People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr.
at 872; Volpp L supra, at 86. The cultural evidee, explained in the testimony of a transcultural
psychologist. was that "'in the Asian culture when the mother commits suicide and leave (Sic] the
children alone, usually they'll be considered to be a totally irresponsible behavior [sic], and the
mother will usually worry what would happen if she died.'" People v. Wu, 286 CaL Rptr. at 885:
Volpp 1, suprm, at 88. Volpp discussed how, in both cases, the cultural evidence introduced is used
to compare a presumably acultural United Stales legal system with Chinese cultum in the first
instance, see Volpp 1, supra, at 64-72 and with trwctural psychology, in the second instance.
See i. at 87-90.
56. See Volpp I, supra note 55, at 62.
57. d at 61.
58. Id.
59. See i&. at77 (discussing the response of feminists to the Chen case).
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that white feminists' rejection of any use of culture in the courtroom
denies the existence of the culture inherent in the United States legal
system,60 and refuses to consider the subordination of women of color
along race lines.6 In this way, Volpp recognizes the false dichotomy
underlying the "liberal's dilemma": the feminists' position against the
introduction of cultural evidence on the ground that such evidence will
result in the disparate treatment of immigrant defendants charged with
crimes of violence against women and children, versus the position in
favor of the introduction of such evidence when necessary to prevent the
subordination of members of the non-dominant culture.
Unfortunately, Volpp's articulation of a compromise between the two
positions fails to consider the procedural context in which such evidence
may be introduced. Although rejecting the adoption of a formal,
independent cultural defense on the ground that it would serve only to
reduce cultures to rigid stereotypes defined by the "expert" United States
legal system,' Volpp proposed an analysis of the decision when to
introduce cultural evidence that would center on the value of
antisubordination. s Valuing antisubordination, Volpp explained, "is
more than a game of hierarchical rankings of 'who's most oppressed';
* it means a serious commitment to evaluating and eradicating all forms
of oppression."'c' She argued that evidence of a defendant's culture
should not be used to impose stereotypes but to address the defendant's
location within his or her "community,... in the diaspora and [his or]
her history." 5
Volpp used such arguments to explain why she felt that use of the
"cultural defense" was appropriate in a case where an Asian woman was
charged with killing her child and inappropriate where an Asian man
was charged with killing his spouse." She explained that an
antisubordination evaluation of the two cases reveals that the cases are
truly about the Asian woman defendant in the first instance and the
Asian woman victim in the second instance.67 She differentiates
60. See id at 78.
61. See id at 81-82. Volpp argued that "[m]any white feminists repeatedly fail to recognize
[the] multiple subordination [of race and gender], and continue to deny that subordination along
lines other than gender gravely impacts women of color." Id. at 81.
62. See id. at 93-94.
63. See id at 97. Volpp described antisubordination as a principle that "does not posit that
those who suffer oppressions lack agency due to their victimization and therefore are not responsible
for their crimes." Id. at 98. She described the principle as mandating an evaluation of a defendant's
agency within the context of her oppression along multiple lines (such as race, gender, and poverty)
and subject to the pressures of forces within and outside her community. See id. She argued that
evidence of culture should be admitted in a manner that does not "explain or close off any story into
being just one story." Id.
64. Id. at98.
65. Id at 100.
66. See id at 97-100 (analyzing People v. Dong Lu Chn, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec.
2, 1988), and People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)).
67. See Volpp L supra note 55, at 98.
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between the two defendants by explaining that the female defendant
"resisted what she perceived as subordination out of a set of very
narrowly defined choices," while the male defendant "acted to constrain
his wife's choices further."
This is Volpp's attempt to articulate a principled distinction between
the use of cultural evidence by immigrant male defendants to mitigate
their culpability with regard to crimes of violence against women and
children with which they are charged and the use of cultural evidence by
immigrant female defendants to mitigate their culpability with regard to
the crimes with which they are charged. It is an impractical and
unprincipled distinction, however, made necessary by Volpp's failure to
consider the procedural context within which cultural evidence should
be introduced.
On the ground that the defendant had acted as an agent of oppression,
Volpp would deny an immigrant male defendant an opportunity to
introduce evidence relevant to the requisite state of mind of the crime
charged or to an element of an available defense to the same extent
afforded all other criminal defendants. 69 She would not deny the same
to female defendants, however, because she sees them as victims of
oppression rather than agents of it.70 In essence, she personalizes the
subordination, failing to recognize that the culture and communities
within which they live act with equal force upon both parties. In
addition, she fails to provide a procedural mechanism for rendering the
antisubordination evaluation that she prescribes. The reader is left
wondering just who will render this analysis and how.
A few months after the publication of Volpp's article, Taryn F.
Goldstein concluded that a formal, independent "cultural defense"
should not be recognized in the American criminal justice system in part
because such a defense "only harms the very groups it purports to
protect." Goldstein noted that opponents of a formal cultural defense
contend that it is really an "ignorance of the law" defense, which is not
recognized by courts in the United States, and used this position to
support her argument against the adoption of a formal, independent
cultural defense. 3 Goldstein relied on examples of the use of cultural
evidence in recent cases to mitigate the culpability of the defendant. 4
She failed, however, to distinguish clearly the use of a formal cultural
68. Id.
69. Seeid.at97-101.
70. See id.
71. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 167. Goldstein stated that a formal. independent cultural
defense would excuse violence t6wards inmigrant .omen and children. See d
72. See id at 158-59.
73. See iU. at 167-68.
74. See id. at 147-55 (analyzing People v. Kmaua, No. A-091133 (Santa Monica Super. CL
Nov. 21, 1985); People v. Mona, No. 315972-0 (Fresno County Super. CL Feb. 7,1985); People
v. Dong La Chen, No. 87-7774 (N.Y. Sup. CL Mar. 21, 1989); People v. Cray. No. 52587 (Placer
County Super. CL Apr. 1990)).
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defense from the procedural context in which cultural evidence was
introduced in these cases!5 A formal cultural defense, wherein evidence
that the conduct giving rise to the criminal charge was consistent with
the culture of the defendant is offered to mitigate the defendant's
culpability solely on the ground that a defendant should not be held
liable for such actions, has not been recognized by any state or by the
United States. A formal cultural defense differs greatly from the
introduction of evidence of culture because of its relevance to proof of
a defense or to the rebuttal of proof of elements of the crime charged.
Goldstein's failure to consider the role of cultural evidence in each of
the trials in whichit was introduced was more blatant than Volpp's and
is evidenced by her statement that the cultural defense has often been
used by defendants to excuse their crimes.7 6 Goldstein misconceived the
use of cultural evidence in the criminal justice process. Obviously, the
defense is not superimposed after a finding of guilt to reverse that
finding. The defense is not a "cultural defense." Rather, the evidence
of culture is introduced as relevant to show a lack of the requisite
elements of the crime charged or to show a requisite element of a
traditional defense, such as provocation or self-defense. When the
evidence successfully rebuts the prosecution's proof, or proves a
defense, the defendant is found not guilty. The defendant's crime has
not been excused; he or she has been found not guilty of committing it.
This is an essential procedural distinction that Goldstein missed because
of her failure to consider the use of such evidence in a procedural
context.
Goldstein's article also evidenced many of the concerns discussed by
Volpp. Goldstein's discussion assumed the existence of an acultural
legal system within the United States,' and failed to consider that an
important aspect of the United States identity is its immigrant culture
and populations.' Such a perspective allowed her to disregard the
subordination of peoples along color, race, and class lines, and to focus
on gender oppression as a justification for opposing the use of cultural
evidence to mitigate culpability. 9
75. Goldstein acknowledged that none of the cases that she discussed employed a "pure
cultural defense," but argued that they demonstrate the ambivalence of courts in the United States
regarding the recognition of a formal defense. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 167.
76. See id. at 146. In discussing the use of the cultural defense by Native Americans, she
stated that they "have also argued a cultural defense to excuse their crimes." Id.
77. See generally i While Goldstein acknowledged a "clash of cultures," see Id. at 141,
167, presumably recognizing the existence of culture within the legal system of the United States,
her discussion demonstrated an ethnocentric examination of the topic wherein she emphasized the
differentness of other cultures from the purportedly objective position of the dominant culture. In
this way, she failed to recognize the varied and rich culture of the United States and reduced it to
the culture of the dominant group, positioning Native Americans, African Americans, Asian
Americans, H-ispanic Americans, and "any minority who has suffered an inhibiting 'experience' in
America" outside of that culture. Id. at 159.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 162-64.
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Holly Maguigan, in her 1995 article, Cultural Evidence and Male
ViokenceW discussed the tension between feminists and multiculturalists
regarding the use of cultural evidence in criminal trials!' Similar to
Volpp and Goldstein, she rejected any formal, independent cultural
defense as impractical to implement and impossible to define in any
meaningful way32 She argued that the debate regarding the imple-
mentation of a separate, formal cultural defense "is misguided because
the use of cultural information is not new, a workable legal definition of
culture is impossible to develop, and the information is not being offered
in court to create a separate defense."' Maguigan contended that the
debate regarding the creation of a formal cultural defense merely
obscured the real need to attempt to bring together seemingly conflicting
reform agendas.'
Maguigan recognized the procedural framework in which cultural
evidence is currently being introduced into criminal trials, analyzing the
use of such evidence in various procedural stages of the criminal justice
process from pre-trial to sentencing.' She acknowledged that cultural
evidence is frequently relevant to a defendant's mens rea and should not
be excluded merely because it explains a defendant's state of mind that
is "unacceptable or incomprehensible" to that of the trial judge.'
Allowing such discretion, she argued, permits a judge to impose the
norms of the dominant culture against which the jury must evaluate the
defendant's conduct. 7
Maguigan's solution to the feminist-multiculturalist debate is a
compromise which allows for the inclusion of cultural evidence to the
extent that it is relevant to prove a defendant's state of mind.
Maguigan recognized this as the first step in the process, however, and
argued that prosecutors have the burden of challenging the introduction
80. Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Vwlence: Are Femdniw and
Mufticulturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L REV. 36
(1995).
81. See id
82. See i at 44.
83. Id at 45.
84. See id Maguigan focused on the seeming tension between thgoals of mndculturalists
and feminists regarding the use of cultural evidence in criminal trials, dismissing the debate about
the creation of a fornal cultural defense as an impediment to reconciliation of that tension and
irrelevant to the current use of cultural evidence. See id at 43-60.
85. See id. at 62-86. Maguigan discussed te use of cultural evidencein plea baraining and
sentencing, see id. at 62-69, in determining culpability, see i& at 71-79. and in scssing
reasonableness of perception, see id at 79-86.
86. See id at 99. Maguigan explained thata "quick fixe tich perits thejudge to exude
evidence of the defendant's state of mind on the basis of the evidence's content is unacceprble
because women and people of color are "routinely perceived as having states of mind unacceptble
to the dominant culture." Id She argued that the current omrempresatation of people of color in
prison in the United States is a result in part, ofjust such an unwillingness to consider and attempt
to understand alternative states of mind. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 87-88.
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and substance of the evidence to ensure that it is not being introduced to
enforce cultural stereotypes.3 9 She argued that the skepticism of
prosecutors and jurors in considering cultural evidence introduced by the
defense is an important safeguard against the use of such evidence to
trivialize violence committed against women and children." Acknowl-
edging the social costs of using cultural information to trivialize such
acts, she maintained that these costs were not a justification for
precluding considerations of culture in criminal trials but, rather, an
incentive for the prosecution and jury to continually view such evidence
with a critical eye."'
Maguigan's procedural approach provides a coherent and practical
solution to the "liberal's dilemma." By her own admission, the solution
is neither quick nor perfect.' It does reconcile the concerns of
multiculturalists and feminists, however, and avoids the shortsightedness
of proposing either a complete ban on the introduction of cultural
evidence or the creation of a formal defense. This Comment reaffirms
her approach and expands upon it in Part V.
A year after Maguigan's article, Doriane Larnbelet Coleman
addressed what she called the "Liberal's Dilemma"--that use of the
"cultural defense" is at once advancing the goals of multiculturalism and
progressive criminal defense philosophy and at the same time is
providing diminished legal protections to immigrant women and
children.' This is so, she argued, because the defense is used most often
by immigrant males to mitigate culpability for crimes committed against
women and children.' While this latter statement appears to be true
when "culture" is defined as she used it, namely to connote immigrant,
patriarchal, non-Western culture, the argument falls apart when a
broader definition, inclusive of the experiences of both genders and all
social classes within a given culture, is employed."
She also argued that the results of the admission of such evidence,
although introduced "in the guise of traditional analysis," comprise a
89. See iL at 90.
90. See id. at 93-97.
91. See id. at 97.
92. See id. at 98-99.
93. See Coleman, supra note 2, at 1094-96.
94. See id. at 1094-95.
95. Coleman defines the cultural defense as "[t]he affirmative presentation of foreign
customs as exonerating evidence in criminal cases where both the defendant and his victim am from
the same culture." Id. at 1100. Such a definition carefully avoids consideration of cases in which
cultural evidence was introduced by defendants charged with crimes against non-immigrant people
and cases in which evidence of non-foreign customs, such as those of a non-dominant culture within
the United States, are introduced: In addition, Coleman illustrated the present use of the cultural
defense with cases whose fact patterns support her limited view of the present use of culture by
criminal defendants to mitigate culpability. See iL at 1105-Il. Finally, she described the practice
of female genital mutilation and insinuated that there had been cases in which a defendant charged
with such acts had successfully made use of cultural evidence to avoid culpability in a thinly-veiled
attempt to inflame sentiment against use of cultural evidence in criminal proceedings. See idL at
1111-13.
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"range of leniencies-from outright exoneration to mitigation-for the
immigrant defendant!' that are inconsistent with traditional notions of
mens rea.' In this argument, Coleman confused substance with form.
Evidence of culture has not been introduced in the "guise of traditional
analysis," but rather by way of the vehicle of "traditional analysis."
Coleman's argument fails to consider that the very admissibility of the
evidence was premised on a finding that it was relevant to an element of
the crime or the defense posited. The framework against which evidence
of culture is sought to be admitted is the traditional framework of the
criminal justice system of each of the united states, historically defined
by white males within that culture. The fact that the content of the
evidence sought to be introduced differs from the values and perspective
of the dominant culture is not enough to make it irrelevant and,
therefore, inconsistent with traditional notions of mens rea.
Coleman concluded by setting forth a resolution of the "liberal's
dilemma" in a balancing test which weighs the defendant's interest in
using cultural evidence and the victim's interest in gaining protection
and relief. 7 She explained that such an approach requires an articula-
tion of the arguments on both sides of the issue, as well as the social
policies supported and opposed by the respective positions, and provides
a framework for the reconciliation of the competing interests.' She then
proceeded to enunciate the interests at stake---the interests of victims of
crime committed by immigrant defendants in ensuring that they are
afforded the same protections as victims of similar crimes by non-
immigrants, and the interests of immigrant defendants in obtaining a
subjective determination of their culpability and sentence---and
concluded that the balancing test always weighs in favor of the
victims.1 ®
The test Coleman articulates has three major flaws. First, it goes
against a traditional and underlying principle of the criminal justice
system wherein the accused's rights are measured against the interests
of society and not of the particular victims involved. The crime charged
is a crime against the state, not against the individual, and the rights of
the defendant cannot be mitigated by considerations for the victim.
Second, Coleman's test assumes that the consideration of cultural
evidence equals a complete and successful defense of the crime charged.
There is no room for the defendant to introduce evidence of culture to
show that an element of the crime has not been proven or to demonstrate
that an element of a legal defense has been established. Nor, presum-
ably, is there room for such evidence in the consideration of plea
bargaining, sentencing, or de minimis motions. Third, a "balancing test"
96. See id. at 1103-04.
97. See i at 1155-57.
98. See id at 1156.
99. See id. at l157.
100. Seeid.atll61.
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that is set forth with a prescription for its result in each and every case
is not a balancing test.
Finally, Left Volpp, responding to Coleman's article, explained that
Coleman's position arises from an imperialist feminism that depicts
feminism as Western or Euro-American and defines non-European
culture from a male perspective.' 0 She argued that such a feminist
theory also eclipses racial and class-based oppression in the name of
gender oppression."° Equally narrow in scope, Volpp argued, is
Coleman's definition of culture, a definition which excludes the effects
of race, poverty, the state, and the dominant culture. 3 Volpp also
contended that Coleman's use of the term "multiculturalism" failed to
acknowledge the current debate as to its definition."
Volpp proposed an antisubordination approach to the determination
of when to allow the introduction of evidence of culture by a criminal
defendant.0 She compared her antisubordination approach to
Coleman's antidiscrimination approach, noting that both seek to
eliminate inequality, but that the latter does so by treating people in a
race-neutral manner while the former is explicitly color conscious.'0
She renewed her suggestion proposed in her 1994 article 17 that we
consider who is seeking to advance the cultural evidence and whether it
is being advanced to further stereotypes and subordination or for the
purpose of assisting the triers of fact in understanding the defendant's
location in "her community, diaspora, and history."'
IV. FEMALE GENTAL MUTILATION: AN ExAMPLE OF THE "LIBERAL'S
DILEMMA" AND THE FLAWS IN THE CURRENT APPROACH TO IT
"Female genital mutilation"'" is a practice performed in many Asian
101. See Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture": Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of Multi-
culturalsm, 96 COLUM. L REV. 1573, 1576 (1996) [hereinafter Volpp 11].
102. See id. at 1581-82.
103. See id. at 1588-94.
104. See id. at 1608. Volpp discussed the current debate regarding "whether multiculturalism
is anti-racist or in fact oblivious to racism; whether multiculturalism means cultural autonomy or
revisiting a common culture; whether multiculturalism is grounded in grassroots alliances or
diversity management; and whether multiculturalism links politics and culture or separates them."
Id. at 1608-09.
105. See id. at 1612; see also Volpp , supra note 55.
106. See id. at 1594-95.
107. See Volpp L supra note 55.
108. VolppILsupranote 101, at 1612.
109. There is cunently much debate about the accuracy of this term. Lei Volpp refers instead
to "female genital surgeries," on the ground that the phrase "female genital mutilation" is a Euro-
centric projection of a "negative moral assessment" of a Third World cultural practice and the
phrase "female circumcision" falsely "implies a mild operation equivalent to male circumcision."
Volpp IL supra note 101, at 1578 n.26 (citing Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-
Travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 189, 193 n.15 (1992)).
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and African cultures."1 There are s'everal forms of female genital
mutilation which vary in their severity."' The least severe form involves
the partial or total removal of the clitoris." 2 The most severe involves
the removal of the clitoris, labia minora, and parts of the labia majora
and the suturing together of the labia majora until only a small hole is
left for the passage of urine and menstrual flow.' The procedure is
often done without anesthesia and with unsanitary and dull cutting
implements." 4 Complications from the procedure range from severe
pain and shock, to chronic infections, infertility, incontinence, inability
to orgasm, and sometimes death."' The World Health Organization
estimates that as many as two million women and girls are subject to this
procedure each year." 6 Forms of female genital mutilation were
practiced in the United States from the late nineteenth century until the
mid-1930s, as a result of physicians' emphasis on the physiological
origins of women's mental disorders,' and are increasingly. being
performed in the United States and other countries as the practice is
brought with the immigrants who settle here." 8
The United States has recently passed a federal law pr6hibiting
female genital mutilation'" and several states have passed similar laws
or have prohibited it as a form of child abuse."z Many feminists argue
for the eradication of this practice and support laws prohibiting it.'
Furthermore, they contend that a "cultural defense" should not be
available to mitigate the culpability of those charged with performing
such procedures."'
110. See Iab Ann larson, Female Gedtal Mutilation in the United States: ChildAbuse or
Constitutional Freedom?, 17 WOMiEN'S RTS. L REP. 237, 237 (1996) (citing Rona Tempest.
Female Genital Mutilation Under Scrutiny at Hearing, USA TODAY, Feb. 11. 1994, at 3A.
available in 1994 WL 11081188).
Ill. See id.at238.
112. See iL (citing Note, What's udtur Got to Do With It? Ecising the Harmful Tradition
of Female Cirmumcision 106 HARV. L REV. 1944,1946 (June 1993)).
113. See id
114. SeeiL at238-39.
115. See iL at 239 (citing Note, supra note 112, at 1948).
116. See Layli MiWler Bashir, Female Genital Mutilation in the United States: An
Examination of Criminal andAsylum Law, 4 AI, UJ. GENDER &L 415,419(1996).
117. See Karen Hughes, The Criminalization of Female Genital Mutilation in the United
States, 4 J.L & POL'Y 321, 332 (1995) (citing Ben Barke-Benfield, Sezual Surgery in Late-
Nineteenth-Centry Arerica, 5 INr'L J. HEALTH SERVCES 279, 283-85 (1975)).
118. Seeid.at333.
119. See 18U.S.C.§ 116(WestSupp. 1997).
120. See, e.g., CAL PENALCODE § 273.4 (West Supp. 1998); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 780
(Michie Supp. 1996); 720 ILL CO.P. STAT. ANN. § 5!12-34 (West Supp. 1998):;MiNN. STAT. AN.
§ 609.2245 (West Supp. 1997-1998); N.D. CENr. CODE § 12.1-36-01 (Michie 1997); TEmN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-110 (Mihie 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.35 (West 1997).
121. See, e.g., Bashir, supra note 116, at 454; Lar, supra note 110. at 257.
122. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 2, at 1166; Larson, supra note 110, at 245.
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The irony in this argument is that those charged with such an offense
are often women.12 Consequently, those feminists who argue the
complete disregard of cultural evidence which mitigates the culpability
of the defendant will be forced to refuse a female defendant, herself
subjected to the procedure as a part of an arguably patriarchal culture,
a voice in the courtroom as to her position in her world. Can this be the
desired end of these feminists?
Perhaps it could be argued that, in this case, the rights of the child
victim are more urgent than the rights of the woman defendant-that the
woman may be silenced when it is a child that she has harmed."
Although this argument surely has merit, an antisubordination approach
may be more instructive on the issue of when and to what extent
evidence of culture ought to be admissible to mitigate the culpability of
a defendant charged with the crime of female genital mutilation. Such
an approach would avoid an analysis which attempts to discern who is
most oppressed or to name the "real" victim. It would avoid Coleman's
positioning of the victim's interests in protection from violence against
the defendant's interests in an equal opportunity to present all evidence
relevant to demonstrating a lack of the requisite state of mind."z The
antisubordination approach would instead look to the defendant's
position within her culture and community and would explore her
actions within the choices available to her. It would allow evidence of
culture to the extent that it would, educate the finders of law and fact as
to her circumstances at the time of her commission of the act for which
she is charged. Such evidence might well reveal an understanding of the
defendant's act, which was previously foreign to members of the
dominant culture, and should be admissible to the extent that it is
relevant to show an element of a defense to the crime charged.
The practice of female genital mutilation may be better understood in
light of its justifications within the cultural context of those populations
that practice it. The justifications advanced for the continued practice
of female genital mutilation include "religion, custom, decreasing the
sexual desire of women, hygiene, aesthetics, and the facility of sexual
relations and fertility."'" In certain cultures, it is a condition of
acceptance into the socio-cultural group and may be a prerequisite to
marriage."2 The practice often has its roots in economic survival in that
it facilitates the marriage of the one upon whom it is performed, whose
marriage may well be necessary to the economic survival of that woman
within her culture. Such evidence may demonstrate the elements of a
defense to the crime charged and should not be excluded merely because
123. See Larson, supra note 110, at 246 (citing Note, supra note 112, at 1946).
124. See i. at 247.
125. See Coleman, supra note 2, at 1155-57.
126. Larson, supra note 110, at 240 (citing Anna Funder, De Minimus Non Curat Lex: The
Clitoris, Culture and the Law, 3 TRANSNAT'L L & CONTEMP. PROBS. 417.436 (1993)).
127. See id. (citing Note, supra note 112, at 1961; Funder, supra note 126, at 436).
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its substance is unusual and even abhorrent to the norms of the dominant
culture.
In seeking to prohibit the practice of female genital mutilation,
caution should be exercised so that the means for its prohibition do not
become a catalyst for racism and ethnocentrism. Evidence that is
relevant under the established laws of the states of the United States
should not be excluded on the grounds that any state of mind that
condones the practice is inherently barbaric. The tendency to position
the legal systems of the states as the advanced society against which all
other cultures will be measured merely serves to deny the rich and varied
culture of the United States and to subordinate non-dominant cultures.
Defendants charged with the perpetration of such a practice must be
viewed within their specific cultural framewor* to the extent that the
framework is relevant within the existing criminal justice process, a pro-
cess admittedly created and imposed by the dominant culture in a court-
room generally controlled by the dominant culture. This does not neces-
sarily mean that the defendant would be excused from responsibility. It
means merely that, in the context of the proof of the elements of the
crime and the existing defenses available to the defendant under the
relevant law, the defendant's culture and voice will be considered.
V. REsOLUTION OF THE "LIBERAL'S DILEMA"
A. Aims of the Criminal Justice System." Individualized Justice?
A thorough analysis of the superficiality of the "liberal's dilemma"
requires a brief examination into the presumptions underlying the law.
Thomas Aquinas, in his work Summa Theologica, defines law as the
rational ordering of things which concern the common good, promul-
gated by whoever has as his or her charge the care of the community."
Aquinas contemplated law as inherently moral and just. 9 In contrast,
Thomas Hobbes, in his work Leviathan, defines law as that which is
necessary to preserve the life of the individual.1" Hobbes rejects any
notion of morality in law and contends that "good" and "evil" are only
meaningful when considered in relation to the individual defining
them. 131
The distinction in these two approaches to law is relevant to the
discussion of this Comment. It is only when one considers an underlying
morality in the law that one can impose upon it disregard for the context
of the doer and the deed. Such notions are evident in much of the
feminist writing on the "cultural defense," which tends to evaluate the
128. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMATHEOLOGICA Art. 4, concL (J. G. Dawon. trans, 1952).
129. See i& at Il1l.
130. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, 66-67 (Evmyan Classics ed.. The Gusey Prs
Co. 1987) (1651).
131. See idL at 24.
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conduct of the defendants in light of an American law that is somehow
more enlightened and progressive, and consequently more moral, than
the culture from which the defendants come.
In contrast, a truly multiculturalist approach recognizes the need to
define conduct and culpability in light of the context in which it occurs.
Morality, it recognizes, is influenced and predetermined to a degree by
the culture of the moralist. It recognizes that morality shifts from
community to community and from role to role within a community.
Experience reinforces this reality. The morality of an American
military combat unit differs from the morality of an American family in
peacetime. In addition, the morality of a soldier in combat is different
from the morality of that same person as a family member in peacetime.
Although few argue this point to these extremes, many contend that a
line does exist beyond which lay actions universally recognized as
immoral. Any attempt to define this line, however, results in a series of
proposed acts, which the proponent believes are generally recognized as
abhorrent, followed by a series of responses that attempt to create a
circumstance in which the proposed behavior would make moral sense.
Universal morality can be defined only to the extent that the definer is
incapable of contemplating circumstances different from her own which
would morally justify the behavior. It is antithetical to a multiculturalist
approach.
The law must, therefore, provide the procedural mechanisms for
considering the variant circumstances of the act that is alleged to be
criminal, recognizing that the criminality of the act depends upon the
absence or presence of those circumstances. In the alternative, the law
must be clear that it is superimposing the morality of its makers, deter-
mined in accordance with their circumstances and experiences, on all
those who are subject to it, regardless of their circumstances. It is the
superimposition of the lawmakers' morals upon others in the name of a
universal morality that is dangerous and oppressive because it permits
the dominant culture, the lawmakers, not only to define morality but also
to dismiss any variant experience as immoral.
B. Redefining Culture
Much of the feminist literature that identifies a dilemma in the use of
cultural evidence to mitigate culpability discusses "culture" as it relates
to immigrant defendants and assumes a culture-neutral legal system132
The narrowness of this definition is at the root of the identified dilemma.
Such a restricted view of the dynamics at play is a result of a strain of
feminism which defines- its world in an ethnocentric and gender
essentialist manner. The United States is viewed as progressive and
feminist while the culture of non-European immigrants is viewed as
132. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 2; Goldstein, supra note 2.
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backwards and patriarchal.133 It is argued that cultural evidence should
not be allowed because it is predominantly used by immigrant males to
mitigate their culpability in acts of violence committed against women
and children pursuant to the patriarchal norms of the defendants'
cultures. 34
Little or no attention is directed, however, at the use of cultural
evidence to mitigate the culpability of immigrant women defendants.
Even less attention is directed to the use of cultural evidence by
American women defendants who occupy positions in the many non-
dominant cultures of this country (e.g., African American and Native
American). 35 Those who do address such uses of the cultural defense
attempt to articulate a principled distinction between the use of such
evidence by female defendants and the use of the same type of evidence
by male defendants. Although they propose a variety of theories or tests
for drawing this distinction, the tests all result in the consistent conclu-
sion that, as to crimes committed by and against adults when the
defendants are female, the admission of cultural evidence is permissible,
but when the defendants are male, it is not."
The dilemma, it appears, is not that cultural evidence should not be
allowed because it potentially mitigates the culpability of defendants
charged with crimes against women. Rather, the issue is that courts are
inclined to allow the introduction of cultural evidence in a racist and
patriarchal manner.
One concern is that courts will allow evidence of a defendant's
culture to be introduced in a manner which merely serves to reinforce
reductive stereotypes and racist beliefs about the defendants and the
victims involved. For example, a court may allow the introduction of
evidence that "wife beating" is condoned and even expected in a
defendant's culture in a manner that suggests that such a defendant is an
unthinking agent of that culture. That same court, in contrast, is
arguably quite unlikely to allow evidence that a defendant's "white-
collar" crimes were merely the almost instinctive and unthinking
responses of a defendant immersed in a culture which condones such
activities. The court would expect some higher level of morality from
this defendant. The fundamental lesson that feminists and
multiculturalists should take from these observations is that we must
ensure not only that our legal system give serious consideration to the
133. Leti Volpp called such a perspective a replication of "the colonialist feminism of a
century ago." See Volpp IL supra note 101, at 1577.
134. See, eg., Coleman, supra note 2, at 1095; Sacks, supra note 2. at 545-46.
135. Dorian Lambelet Coleman summarily rejected the possibility that anyone, including
"strong multiculturalists," is seriously willing to extend the cultural defense to non-immigrant
Amercans. See Coleman, supra note 2, at 1162,1164-65. To the extent that cultural evidence is
permitted as relevant to an established element of the crime charged or the defense contended.
however, such evidence is relevant regardless of whether the defendant is a naturalized citizen of
the United States or a recent immigrant.
136. See, e.g., Coleman. supra note 2 at 1155-61 (discussing her balancing test).
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cultural influences and experiences of each defendant, but, equally
important, that our courts never engage in the sort of racist, reductive
stereotyping discussed above in the name of multiculturalism. Consider-
ations of culture must not eclipse the consideration of the defendant's
agency within that culture.
A second concern is that courts will allow evidence of culture as
viewed through a patriarchal lens. This may occur in two ways. First,
evidence of the culture of the men of a people may be admitted as a
substitute for, and the equal of, the culture of the entire people.
Although this is often done inadvertently, it collapses the experience of
gender that exists within the non-dominant culture. Second, culture may
be defined in a manner which makes cultural evidence relevant only for
male immigrant defendants. In other words, it is imperative that courts
avoid defining culture in a manner which would find significant the
differences between males in the dominant culture and individuals in
non-dominant cultures while failing to find significance between males
in the dominant culture and females in that same culture. Gender
experiences certainly influence the experience of any culture and,
therefore, should be considered an element of a defendant's culture. 37
A third concern is that courts will allow evidence of culture without
regard to socioeconomic class. One's cultural experience differs greatly
across economic lines and this variable should also be considered as
relevant to the examination of cultural evidence. The cultural experi-
ences of people of poverty and people of wealth, though of the same
nationality, should not be condensed into a common experience.
Socioeconomic status is a relevant factor to the determination and
definition of one's culture.
C. The Cultural Defense in Its Procedural Context
Much of the current literature on the "cultural defense" rejects the
notion of an independent defense of culture in addition to the already
existing mechanisms for introducing evidence of culture to mitigate
culpability."' An independent defense of culture is no more than a
defense based on ignorance of the law, a doctrine long rejected as a
defense in this country's criminal justice system. Recognition of such
137. Interestingly, some courts have been more accepting of the role gender plays in the
perceptions of a criminal defendant than the role played by the defendant's tribal culture in
assessing the elements of self-defense as a defense to the crime charged. See, e.g., Washington v.
Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548,558-59 (Wash. 1977) (concluding that ajury instruction on self-defense
that persistently used the masculine gender improperly characterized the law by creating an
objective standard of reasonableness, suggesting that the female defendant's conduct was to be
measured against that of a reasonable male in the same circumstances, while declining to allow the
defendant to present testimony of the effects of her Indian culture on her actions and perceptions
in her circumstance).
138. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 2, at 166-67; Maguigan, supra note 80, at 44.
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a defense would open the door to other forms of the ignorance-of-the-
law defense.
In addition, it would become incredibly burdensome and superficial
to attempt to distinguish between those entitled to such a defense and
those not so entitled. Would an immigrant ten years in this country, a
graduate of a United States university, and employed by a United States
company be more entitled to this defense than a citizen born in the
United States who was truly ignorant of the law under which she is
charged?
Rather than a formal cultural defense, it is best to introduce evidence
of culture to mitigate culpability within the existing legal framework.
Defendants properly introduce cultural evidence within an established
procedural context. It may be introduced before trial as part of the plea
bargaining process, during trial as evidence of a lack of mens rea or of
the existence of an established defense, or after trial as a consideration
during sentencing.
This distinction is essential to an understanding of the role that the
evidence of culture plays in the trial. It is not being offered as an
alternative to previously established defenses. Evidence of culture is
being offered within an established system of defined crimes and
defenses. As such, its relevance must be determined according to its
relevance to the particular element of the crime or defense for which it
is being offered. And as such, to deny the introduction of cultural
evidence when it is relevant is to deny an equal opportunity to all
defendants to present a defense. The result is not a "special right"
offered to immigrant defendants and others. Each and every defendant
has a right to present a defense, introducing all factors relevant to such
defense.139
VI CONCLUSION
The "liberal's dilemma" is an artificial creation resulting from a
failure to consider the relevance of cultural evidence and an overly
narrow construction of what constitutes culture. It is presented as an
awesome dilemma, but in reality it is as two dimensional as the projected
face of the "great and powerful Oz." A careful examination behind the
curtain of the supposed dichotomy between the values of multicultural-
ism and feminism with regard to the introduction of evidence of a
criminal defendant's culture to mitigate culpability reveals the source of
the illusion. An overly narrow construction of culture and the failure to
consider the use of evidence of culture in the procedural context of trial
project an image of diametrically opposed interests-multiculturalism
versus feminism.
139. See, e-g., Washington v. Texas, 388 US. 14.18-19 (1967) (citing In re Oliver. 333 U.S.
257,273 (1948)).
1998] 469.
470 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:445
But upon examination of the reality behind the curtain, it is evident
that evidence of a defendant's culture, offered and admitted to the extent
that it is relevant to the elements of the crime charged and the defenses
argued, does not compromise any expressed values of feminism any
more than the admission of any evidence that is relevant to the mitiga-
tion of a defendant's culpability. Such evidence can not be excluded
merely because it is offered to mitigate the culpability of an immigrant
defendant charged with crimes against a woman or child. Such an
exclusion would be a denial of the defendant's rights to a defense in the
same manner as is available to any other defendant. Evidence of a
defendant's culture is admitted, not as an exceptional defense unavail-
able to members of the dominant culture, but rather, as relevant to a full
evaluation of the defendant's conduct and the circumstances in which he
acted to the extent that it is consistent with the established defenses
available to all defendants under the laws of the states.
Deborah M. Boulette Taylor
